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Potential Output in a Rapidly Developing Economy:
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The authors use a growth accounting framework to examine growth of the rapidly developing
Chinese economy. Their findings support the view that, although feasible in the intermediate term,
China’s recent pattern of extensive growth is not sustainable in the long run. The authors believe
that China will be able to sustain a growth rate of 8 to 9 percent for an extended period if it moves
from extensive to intensive growth. They next compare potential growth in China with historical
developments in the United States and the European Union. They discuss the differences in produc-
tion structure and level of development across the three economies that may explain the countries’
varied intermediate-term growth prospects. Finally, the authors provide an analysis of “green” gross
domestic product and the role of natural resources in China’s growth. (JEL L10, L96, O30) 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, July/August 2009, 91(4), pp. 317-42.
In recent years, economists have increasingly
referred to China’s growth pattern as “extensive.”
Extensive growth is intrinsically unsustainable
because growth is generated mainly through an
increase in the quantity of inputs rather than
increased productivity. In a previous paper (Zheng,
Bigsten, and Hu, 2009), we focused on China’s
capital deepening versus TFP growth and private
versus government initiatives. In this article, we
first compare China’s growth performance with
what would otherwise have been feasible, taking
into account the main factors commonly employed
to generate growth in rapidly developing econ  -
omies. In other words, we compare official statis-
tics with estimates of “potential” output growth to
shed further light on China’s recent growth patterns. 
T
he rapid development of emerging
markets is changing the landscape of
the world economy and may have
profound implications for international
relations. China has often been regarded as the
most influential emerging market economy.
Projections indicate that the absolute size of the
Chinese economy may be larger than that of the
United States within two to three decades. While
China’s growth performance since reform has
been hailed as an economic miracle (Lin, Cai, and
Li, 1996), concerns over the sustainability of its
growth pattern have emerged in recent years
when measured total factor productivity (TFP)
growth has slowed.
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potential of the Chinese economy and discuss
China’s impact on the world economy. Specifi  -
cally, we compare potential growth in China with
that for the United States and European Union
(EU). We note that structural characteristics, rapid
accumulation in capital stock, and improvement
in labor quality are the major factors behind
China’s phenomenal economic growth. China’s
future TFP growth is likely to be faster than that
of the United States and EU because of the stock
of world knowledge it may easily access at afford-
able prices to enhance its production possibilities
(Prescott, 2002). 
Nobel laureate Ed Prescott (1998) asked why
“growth miracles” are a recent phenomenon. We
suspect that the main reasons are differences in
production structure and in the level of develop-
ment. Examples include the East Asian newly
industrialized countries (NICs), to some extent
post-WWII Japan and Germany, and the Soviet
Union between the first and second World Wars
and in the early years of the Cold War. Now, due
to rapid industrialization, China will soon join the
ranks of the high-performing East Asian nations.
Understanding the causes and conditions of eco-
nomic miracles may prove useful for developing
countries. Understanding differences in produc-
tion structure and the level of development may
also help explain why productivity slowed in the
United States and EU in the early 1970s, then
started to surge in the United States but stagnated
in Europe in the mid-1990s.
To analyze growth potential, we consider the
usual suspects of demographics, rural-urban
migration, and aging. In addition, we discuss
how estimates of potential output have affected
Chinese government policy regarding growth
planning. Because environmental regulations
and concerns are of increasing international
importance, we assess in the final section of this
analysis the influence of environmental factors—
specifically, to what extent past economic growth
reflected environmental “inputs” not elsewhere
accounted for. 
THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
Years before the current worldwide credit
crunch, the economics literature included many
works that foresaw the looming economic crisis
(e.g., Gordon, 2005; Phelps, 2004; Stiglitz, 2002;
and Brenner, 2000 and 2004). Gordon’s (2005)
application of the growth accounting framework
to the study of the U.S. productivity revival and
slowdown stands out as convincing evidence that
economic theory can powerfully inform empirical
analysis for macroeconomic planning. 
Since the publication of Solow’s seminal work
on technical progress and the aggregate produc-
tion function, growth accounting has been used
to assess the economic performance of the former
Soviet Union (Ofer, 1987), raise concerns about the
sustainability of the economies of the East Asian
“tigers” (Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore, and
Taiwan) just a few years before the East Asian
financial crisis (Young, 1995; Kim and Lau, 1994;
and Krugman, 1994), and, recently, forewarn plan-
ners about the macroeconomic imbalances in
China (Zheng and Hu, 2006).
Adequately implemented and understood,
growth accounting is a useful instrument for
improving the analysis of growth potential for
many countries and regions. Several examples
in the literature show that growth accounting
methods are sensitive enough to detect significant
changes in productivity performance if production
parameters are carefully chosen.
Growth accounting decomposes growth in
output into its components: 
(1)                 
where Y is gross domestic product (GDP) and Y
.
change in GDP over time; K is capital stock and
K
.
the change in capital stock; labor is L and L
.
the change in labor input; TFP growth is A
.
/A; 
0 < α < 1 is the output elasticity of capital; and ￿1
– α￿ is the output elasticity of labor.
Potential output growth may be calculated
via equation (1) from knowledge of the potential
growth of each of the right-hand side components,
plus estimates of output elasticities for the vari-
ous inputs. Obviously, both the growth potentials
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tries, reflecting structural differences. Typical
growth accounting structures are represented as
follows: For China (Chow and Li, 2002; and Chow,
2008),
(2)                  
for the United States (Congressional Budget Office
[CBO], 2001),
(3)                   
and for the EU (Mossu and Westermann, 2005),1
(4)                   
China has an output elasticity of capital of 0.6,
compared with 0.3 for the United States. Differ  -
ences of this magnitude are large enough to gen-
erate a significant difference between the growth
potential of the two economies. For example, a
capital stock growth rate of 10 percent would
enable China to grow by at least 6 percent per
year, whereas, all else constant, it would increase
the U.S. growth rate by only 3 percent per year.
Growth differences can also be related to differ-
ences in investment in physical capital as well
as in TFP growth. For developing economies such
as China, investment opportunities abound
because of the country’s relatively low level of
development compared with that of the United
States, EU, and other industrialized countries.
For the same reason, China more easily absorbs
and benefits from existing worldwide technology,
whereas developed economies, especially the
United States, have to rely on new knowledge and
innovations to shift their production frontier. 
Steady-State and Sustainable Growth
The growth accounting framework provides
a compact formula for the study of potential out-
put growth. We define “potential output” as the
highest level of real GDP that can be sustained
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over the period of interest. Growth associated
with potential output can therefore be termed
“sustainable growth.” We divide sustainable
growth into three categories according to the dif-
ferent time frames considered. 
The first concept of sustainable growth refers
to circumstances in which certain measures of
output growth are maintained permanently as
time goes to infinity. The literature offers two dif-
ferent though related output measures that may be
used in this context. Different studies have used
them for different purposes. Sustainable growth
can be defined as a growth pattern that generates
sustained growth in per capita income over an
infinite time horizon. Usually, per capita income
is treated as a measure of living standards. Follow  -
ing Romer (2006), the standard Solow growth
model can be expressed as follows:
(5)                
where Y is total output, F￿.￿ is the production
function, K is capital input, L is labor input, and
A￿t￿ is the level of technology that progresses at
the exponential rate x while the labor force grows
at the exponential rate n. The change in capital
stock is given by
(6)         
where I is investment, ʴ the real depreciation rate,
and s the saving rate. For I = sY = s . F￿K,L,A￿t￿￿,
we have
(7)                 
Dividing by labor input, L, on both sides of equa-
tion (7) yields 
(8)              




Y F K L A t A t
A t e L t e
xt
= ( ) ( ) ( ) ≥
( ) = ( ) =
, , , ,
,
       
   
 0
n nt,
 K I K s F K L A t K =− =⋅ ( ) ( )− δδ , , ,





























n = ( )










FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REVIEW JULY/AUGUST 2009 319
1 Proietti, Musso, and Westermann (2007) set capital elasticity at
0.35 and labor elasticity at 0.65.Rearrange equation (9):
(10)       
combine equations (8) and (10): 
(11)           
then divide k on both sides of the equation to get
the growth rate of k given by
(12)           
At steady state, ʳ*
k is constant, which requires
that s, n, and ʴ are also constant. Thus the average
product of capital, F￿k,A￿t￿￿/k, is constant in the
steady state. Because of constant returns to scale,
F￿1,A￿t￿/k￿ is therefore constant only if k and A￿t￿
grow at the same rate; that is ʳ*
k = x. Output per
capita is given by 
(13)        
and the steady-state growth rate of y = x. This
implies that, in the long run, output per capita
grows at the rate of technical progress, x. Note
that this conclusion is conditioned on parameters
of the model staying constant, including the saving
rate and, hence, the rate of capital formation. This
property of the model may explain why develop-
ing economies can grow faster, as exhibited by
the growth miracles in the East Asian NICs, than
developed economies because the potential for
absorbing new technologies is larger in the former. 
Another important implication of the Solow
growth model is that less-advanced economies,
such as China, will tend to have higher growth
rates in per capita income than the more-advanced
economies, such as the United States and EU,
because there are more investment opportunities
in developing nations. The World Bank (1997, 
p. 12) called this phenomenon “the advantages of
the backwardness.” This property is also referred
to as “absolute convergence” when the analysis
is not conditioned on other characteristics of the
econ  omies and “conditional convergence” when
the analysis is only valid among economies with
the same steady-state positions. However, caution
should be exercised when applying this property
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erty demonstrates only what the supply side of
the economy could achieve if other factors, such
as demand conditions, efficiency of the economy,
and political stability, are present. 
Extensive versus Intensive Growth
Sustainable growth might as well be inter-
preted as growth of GDP only, which is particularly
interesting if one is interested in the absolute size
of the economy. It is the size of the aggregate econ-
omy that matters with regard to international influ-
ence in both economics and politics. Sustain  able
growth in this context means the rate of invest-
ment need not rise in order to maintain a given
rate of GDP growth. Such sustainable growth is
considered intensive growth. A borderline case for
sustainable growth of this kind is when the capi-
tal stock growth rate equals the GDP growth rate. 
Extensive growth refers to a growth strategy
focused on increasing the quantities of inputs
(Irmen, 2005). As capital accumulation and growth
of the labor force raise the growth rate of aggregate
output, because of diminishing returns these
growth effects will not have a permanent effect on
per capita income growth (Irmen, 2005). In con-
trast, intensive growth focuses on TFP. In our
model, labor growth and TFP growth are exoge-
nous; the only input with endogenous growth is
capital. A key feature of the extensive growth
model is that capital grows faster than GDP (or
gross national product) because of the high growth
rate of capital on the one hand and few produc-
tivity advancements on the other. Consequently,
the share of investment in GDP, in constant prices,
must grow continuously to sustain the growth rate
of capital (Ofer, 1987). Specifically, the relation
between I (investment), K (the capital stock), and
Y (national product) in real terms can be written
as follows: 
(14)                    
Notice that the growth accounting formula
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of technology. Given the growth rate in the labor
input and the rate of technological progress, sus-
tainable growth in Y requires sustainable growth
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/Y. In other words,
the gross capital formation rate does not have to
rise to sustain a given growth rate in output, which
is feasible.





declines and a constant I/K implies a rising I/Y,
which is not sustainable in the long run. Moreover,
the share of investment in GNP in current prices
may be written as IC/KC = IPI/YPY, where C rep-
resents “in current prices” and P the price level.
A change in the relative price of I (for example,
due to faster technological change) may slow the
rise of I/Y in real terms. 
If the initial capital stock growth rate is suffi-
ciently low, the economy will grow for a sustained
period of time even if capital stock growth exceeds
GDP growth substantially. Examples are the Soviet
economy in the 1950s and 1960s, the Japanese
economy during about the same period, and later
the East Asian NICs from the 1960s to 1980s. These
economies all experienced rapid economic growth
in a relatively short period of time. If the capital
growth rate is too high, extensive growth may not
be sustainable in the intermediate term or the long
run. In some typical cases, sustainable growth
requires that the saving rate (and hence the capital
formation rate) vary only within a feasible range
(say, between 0 to 50 percent) if borrowing is not
allowed. Compared with sustainable growth in
per capita income in the long run, this type of
growth can be sustained only for a limited time
because it relies on growth of transitional dynam-
ics rather than on steady-state growth capabilities.
Sustainable Growth with Input
Constraints
A third concept of sustainable/potential
growth is related to sustainable growth in inputs,
especially labor. Everything else equal, change in
the labor input can be crucial for growth to be
sustained. The economic history of many coun-
tries shows that demographics are important for
rapid economic growth. In many developed
countries, faster growth rates may not be sus-
tained simply because labor is lacking. A coun-
try with a large population either too young or
too old to work will have a lower growth rate
than one with a large working-age population. 
Following Musso and Westermann (2005),
we decompose labor input into its components.
Because we do not have hours worked as a meas-
ure of labor, we use employment. Employment,
E, at time t is defined as the difference between
the labor force, N, and total unemployment, U,
and can be expressed as a function of the unem-
ployment rate, ur. The labor force is the product
of the participation rate, pr, and the working-age
population, pWA. The working-age population is
a function of total population, P, and the depend-
ency ratio, dr, where the latter is defined as the
ratio between the number of persons below 15
and above 64 years of age and the working-age
population. These relationships are summarized
as follows: 
(15)              
The potential GDP growth of China may be
expressed as 
(16)   
where the variables are
gY, the growth rate of potential output, Y;
gA, growth of total factor productivity, A;
α, the output elasticity of capital; 
￿1 – α￿, the output elasticity of labor;
i, the investment rate;
ʴ, the depreciation rate;
gh, growth in years of schooling, h;
gur, growth of the unemployment rate, ur; 
gpr, growth of the participation rate, pr;
gdr, growth of the dependency ratio, dr; and, 
gp, the growth rate of the population, p. 
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A comparison of the three concepts above
can be derived from the Solow growth model, but
each emphasizes a different aspect of the growth
problem. Sustainable growth is derived according
to the steady-state solution of the dynamic system.
It refers to the mathematical long run, given that
the saving rate, depreciation, and population
growth are fixed. The variable of interest is the
growth rate of per capita income and, hence, TFP
growth. In this case, the Solow growth model
predicts that low-income economies will grow
faster than high-income economies, which leads
to the concept of convergence.
The second concept, extensive versus inten-
sive growth, concerns directly the GDP growth
rate rather than per capita income. In this case,
the saving rate is allowed to change. When the
investment rate is so high that the saving rate must
rise to, say, over 50 percent of GDP, then the
growth pattern is considered problematic. Such
growth is not sustainable, even in the intermediate
term. However, the problem may arise slowly: 
If the capital stock growth rate is only 3 percent
per year, it may take two or three decades for the
saving rate to rise to 30 percent of GDP, even if
the growth pattern was initially extensive. This
is a major difference between rapidly developing
and developed economies. The latter need not
worry much about the intermediate term if growth
in capital stock exceeds GDP growth, because
growth rates are generally low in the relevant
variables. In the long run, however, no extensive
growth pattern is sustainable. This concept height-
ens the need to pay attention to the pattern of
capital accumulation.
The third concept emphasizes the input con-
straints. Growth will be sustained only as long
as sufficient inputs are available at a given point
in time. This formulation is often used to separate
the labor input into its components.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
In this section, we present two sets of empiri-
cal results within the framework outlined previ-
ously. We first use data from 1978-2007 to update
our growth accounting results from Zheng,
Bigsten, and Hu (2009). The emphasis is the time-
series behavior of TFP growth. Based on our TFP
estimates, we provide potential growth measures
conditional on the given investment rate and
factors related to labor input, including demo-
graphics and the labor participation rate. We then
compare the estimated potential growth with
official statistics. 
The second set of results offers projections of
future growth. The growth scenarios should not
be seen as simple extrapolations based on histori-
cal data. In fact, our calibration exercise relies
heavily on knowledge of the production structure
of the Chinese economy and the concept of inten-
sive growth.
China’s Growth Pattern and Potential
China’s development strategy in recent years
has been successful in promoting rapid economic
growth, but it also created a series of macroeco-
nomic imbalances. The rapid growth has benefited
China both economically and politically, but
whether it can or will be sustained, and for how
long, is uncertain. The growth has been generated
mainly through the expansion of investment
(extensive growth) and only marginally through
increased productivity (intensive growth). Some
economists fear that if corrective measures are not
taken, per capita income will eventually cease to
grow. Kuijs and Wang (2006) point out that, if
China’s current growth strategies are unchanged,
the investment-to-GDP ratio would need to reach
unprecedented levels in the next two decades in
order to maintain GDP growth of 8 percent per
year. Our estimates in Table 1 show that China’s
growth pattern has been extremely extensive, with
capital stock growth exceeding GDP growth by
3.56 percent during 1995-2007.
Next, we use equation (16) to calculate a
measure of potential growth during 1978-2007.
Our measure is built from estimates of the poten-
tial growth of each of the main factors that con-
tribute to sustainable growth, that is, the terms
on the right-hand side of equation (16). The first
term in equation (16), gA, is the TFP growth rate.
We use a growth rate of 3.3 percent for the period
1978-95 and 1.9 percent for 1995-2007, as in
Zheng, Hu, Bigsten
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in equation (16) is the contribution of capital
(equal to the investment rate minus the depreci-
ation rate, multiplied by an output elasticity of
capital of 0.5). The third term in equation (16) is
the contribution of labor: the sum of the growth
rates of hours worked per person, labor force par-
ticipation, and population, minus the weighted
growth rate of the unemployment rate and depend-
ency ratio. We replace the growth of hours worked
per person with the growth of quality-adjusted
employment (multiplied by the average years of
schooling). Figure 1 shows that, starting in 2002,
actual GDP growth exceeded potential growth
during six consecutive years. This result is con-
sistent with the growth accounting result based
on the realized production data in Table 1.2
Projections for the Medium Term 
Many projections for China’s future output
potential have appeared in recent years. We pro-
vide our own estimates using the analytical frame-
work introduced earlier. We show that it is a valid
concern that China’s growth pattern as measured
by potential output may not be sustainable. The
growth accounting result is striking when com-
pared with what the government considers a sus-
tainable growth target (8 percent for 2008).
Our projections rely heavily on two basic
premises: (i) Capital stock growth cannot exceed
GDP growth and (ii) a TFP growth rate of 2 to 3
percent must prevail for the foreseeable future.
China’s government was concerned about main-
taining a GDP growth rate of 8 percent, both in
the wake of the East Asian financial crisis of 1997
and when the Chinese economy started to over-
heat in 2003. We show how the “magic” 8 per-
Zheng, Hu, Bigsten
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2 “Green” GDP estimates and TFP trends will be discussed later in
the paper.
Table 1
Growth Accounting for China (percent)
Variable 1978-95 1995-2007
GDP 10.11 9.25
Capital stock 9.12 12.81
Quality-adjusted labor 3.49 2.78
TFP 3.80 1.45
SOURCE: Updated to 2007 from Zheng, Bigsten, and Hu (2009),















GDP Growth, 1978-2007cent growth rate can be derived from the growth
accounting framework. Suppose that the border-
line growth rate between extensive and intensive
growth can be expressed as 
which can be derived from the usual growth
accounting formula assuming that the capital
stock growth rate, gK, equals the output growth
rate, gY. In Table 2, the GDP growth rate, gY, is in
the far-right-hand column; other columns show
combinations of parameters consistent with gY.
With a 3 percent TFP growth rate and 0.05 output
elasticity of capital, the maximum sustainable
output growth rate would be 9 percent. With a 2
percent TFP growth rate and 0.06 output elastic-
ity of capital, the maximum sustainable output
growth rate would be 8 percent, which is consis-
tent with the Chinese government’s growth target










The magical 8 percent growth rate also has
interesting implications for the structural
parameters of the production function. When the
assumed output elasticity of capital is 0.6, the
corresponding sustainable growth rate is exactly
8 percent if TFP growth is 2 percent per year.
However, 8 percent growth will not be sustainable
if TFP growth is 2 percent per year but the output
elasticity of capital is 0.5. Sustainable growth will
be slightly more than 8 percent if TFP growth is
3 percent per year. Slower growth in the labor
input (demographics) will reduce the projected
output growth rate to some extent, but the trends
will remain the same.
Economic growth in developing economies
is considered to be mainly affected by three fac-
tors: rural-urban migration, demographics, and
educational attainment. In the late 1990s, Chinese
planners were preoccupied with maintaining a
growth rate of 8 percent in the face of the East
Asian financial crisis. Such forecasts relied on
China’s ability to maintain high capital forma-
Zheng, Hu, Bigsten
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Table 2
Sustainable Growth for the Chinese Economy
α gK gL gA αgK (1–α)gL gY
0.5 11 33 5.5 1.5 10.0
0.6 11 33 6.6 1.2 10.8
0.5 11 32 5.5 1.5 9.0
0.6 11 32 6.6 1.2 9.8
0.5 10 33 5.0 1.5 9.5
0.6 10 33 6.0 1.2 10.2
0.5 10 32 5.0 1.5 8.5
0.6 10 32 6.0 1.2 9.2
0.5 9334.5 1.5 9.0
0.6 9335.4 1.2 9.6
0.5 9324.5 1.5 8.0
0.6 9325.4 1.2 8.6
0.5 8334.0 1.5 8.5
0.6 8334.8 1.2 9.0
0.5 8324.0 1.5 7.5
0.6 8324.8 1.2 8.0tion—but if the capital growth rate exceeds the
GDP growth rate, the result is extensive growth,
which is likely not sustainable in the longer run,
as discussed above. 
We offer one more example. For simplicity,
we omit the role of human capital accumulation
(see Zheng, Bigsten, and Hu, 2009). Assuming, say,
the output elasticity of capital is 0.5, the capital
stock increases 8 percent per year, and the labor
force grows slightly above 1 percent (as it has in
the past decade), the TFP growth rate would be
required to be 3.5 percent to achieve 8 percent GDP
growth. Further, this would require the TFP con-
tribution to GDP growth to reach 44 percent, which
may be difficult to achieve in practice. Using this
as a benchmark, the 5-year forecasts presented
for China’s 10th and 11th congressional sessions
appear wildly overoptimistic because they require
TFP growth to contribute 54 to 60 percent of GDP
growth (see Zheng, Bigsten, and Hu, 2009). 
COMPARISONS WITH THE U.S.
AND EU ECONOMIES 
In this section, given the structural differences,
we calibrate the model to compare a typical sce-
nario for the Chinese economy with the U.S. and
EU economies. We demonstrate that growth poten-
tial varies across the three major economies
because of differences in production structure,
the level of development, and opportunities for
absorbing foreign technologies. Growth in devel-
oped countries relies on mainly technological
innovations because investment opportunities are
far fewer than in developing countries. Because
technology development often presents patterns
of cyclical fluctuations, attempts to counterbal-
ance business cycles or alter the trajectory of
growth potentials may result in short-term gains
but long-term losses. Understanding this is crucial
for central banks to carry out sound monetary
policies and to prevent future financial crises.
China clearly has benefitted from extensive
growth in the intermediate term, but as previously
shown this level of growth is not sustainable in
the long run. However, China may still enjoy a
high growth rate of 8 to 9 percent if it manages
the transformation from extensive to intensive
growth (see Table 2).
In his report to the First Session of the 11th
National People’s Congress in March 2008,
Premier Wen Jiabao stated that “On the basis of
improving the economic structure, productivity,
energy efficiency and environmental protection,
the GDP should grow by about eight percent”
(Xinhua, 2008). This is the fourth consecutive
year China set its GDP growth target at 8 percent
(after five consecutive years of double-digit GDP
growth) to emphasize the government’s desire to
promote both sound and fast economic and social
development.3 Until recently, China has tightened
monetary policy to curb inflation and an over-
heated property market to help the transition from
extensive to intensive growth.
However, it appears that China’s measures to
cool its economy to a sustainable level were not
well timed, considering recent developments in
the world economy. By November 2008, most rich
economies were facing recession. The U.S. econ-
omy has been in recession since December 2007
(as confirmed by the National Bureau of Economic
Research in December 2008). In November 2008,
the European economy officially fell into its first
recession since the euro was introduced. In China,
industrial production grew by only 8.2 percent
from January through October 2008, less than half
the pace of the previous year and its slowest for
seven years. China announced a massive stimulus
package ($586 billion) in early November 2008.
Although the stimulus package was intended
to boost domestic demand and create more jobs,
the World Bank pointed out that the stimulus
policies provide China with a good opportunity
to rebalance its economy in line with the objec-
tives of the 11th Congress’s five-year plan: “The
stimulus package contains many elements that
support China’s overall long-term development
and improve people’s living standards. Some of
the stimulus measures give some support to the
rebalancing of the pattern of growth from invest-
Zheng, Hu, Bigsten
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3 China revised its GDP growth for 2007 from 11.9 percent to 13.0
percent and in that year overtook Germany to become the world’s
third-largest economy (Reuters, 2009). The growth figure was
announced by the National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBSC)
and was the fastest since 1993 (when GDP grew 13.5 percent).ment, exports, and industry to consumption and
services. The government can use the opportunity
of the fiscal stimulus package to take more
rebalancing measures, including on energy and
resource pricing; health, education, and the social
safety net; financial sector reform; and institutional
reforms” (World Bank, 2008, p. 1). 
In the longer term, China will be able to main-
tain its momentum as a rapidly developing econ-
omy well into the next two decades or so while
the United States and EU may manage a growth
rate of only 2 to 3 percent (as calibrated in Table
3).4 Structural differences help explain the large
differences in growth potential between China
and the United States and EU. The contribution
of capital in China is twice that in the United
States. The level of development provides even
greater opportunities for China than the United
States and EU. Investment opportunities in China
are nearly double those in the United States5;
and the potential for China to absorb new tech-
nologies from developed nations is double that
for the United States and EU.
Moreover, a shortage of labor (another impor-
tant input to the production process) in developed
economies will hinder faster growth of these
economies in the intermediate term. In about 20
years China will face the same problem as its pop-
ulation ages. Demographic change due to China’s
baby boomers of the 1960s and 1970s entering
retirement age may significantly affect the labor
supply and the country’s capacity to save and
invest. 
In the long run, economic prosperity depends
on innovation-driven productivity growth. There
is evidence, however, that worldwide innovations
might have been ineffective in recent decades.
The literature on diminishing technological
opportunities since the early 1960s and recent
studies on endogenous growth, which discuss
related issues (see, e.g., Jones, 1999; Segerstrom,
1998; and Kortum, 1997), address this phenome-
non. In a series of recent articles, Gordon (e.g.,
2004) addresses the issue in terms of demand
creation for new products and technological
advances and suggests that the U.S. productivity
revival that began in 1995 might not be sustainable
(see Table 4). This suggests that the productivity
slowdown that began in other developed coun-
tries in the early 1970s may continue into the
next decade or so. Given the input constraints
on potential output growth in the United States
and EU, productivity is left as the only source of
extra growth.
In this regard, historical lessons from the
former Soviet Union need to be taken seriously.
Soviet growth was spectacular: Its industrial
4 The growth rate in Table 3 is somewhat too optimistic for U.S.
economists: “[M]ainstream economists are exceptionally united
right now around the proposition that the trend growth rate of real
gross domestic product (GDP) in the United States—the rate at
which the unemployment rate neither rises nor falls￿is in the 2
percent to 2.5 percent range” (Blinder, 2002, p. 57).
5 Sterman (1985) presented a behavioral model of the economic long
wave, which showed that “capital self-ordering” was sufficient to
generate long waves. In Sterman (1983), capital self-ordering means
that the capital-producing sector must order capital equipment
such as large machinery to build up productive capacity. 
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Table 3
Growth Projections (2009-30, percent)
Countries Capital stock  Labor TFP GDP
China 8.0  3.0 2.5  8.0
United States 4.0 0.5  1.2  3.1
EU 3.0 0.0  1.0  2.2
NOTE: Output elasticity of both capital and labor is 0.5 for China, 0.4 for the EU, and 0.3 for the United States.
Investment expansions in the 1950s and 1960s accumulated large
excess capacity in the United States and European Union. “But
while stimulating basic research and training the labor force for
‘new-wave’ technologies are important, innovation alone will not
be sufficient to lift the economy into a sustained recovery as long
as excess capacity in basic industries continues to depress invest-
ment” (Sterman, 1983, p. 1276). structure changed from an economy with an 82
percent rural population and a GNP produced
mainly by agriculture to one with a 78 percent
urban population and 40 to 45 percent of GNP
originating in manufacturing and related indus-
tries (Ofer, 1987). This pattern of extensive growth
lasted nearly 70 years, from the late 1920s to the
mid-1980s. By 1970, Soviet TFP growth was zero
and has been negative ever since (see Table 4).
Although the current problem in Western coun-
tries is different because their patterns of growth
have not been as extensive (for example, growth
in capital stock has been 3 to 4 percent), their
limited growth in TFP has been worrisome. 
Limited TFP growth has important implica-
tions for macroeconomic planning. A straightfor-
ward strategy to boost productivity growth, of
course, is to increase spending on research and
development. Though many policymakers would
like to believe that research and development for
information and computer technologies (ICT) may
benefit an economy in the long run, when manag-
ing the macroeconomy they need to consider the
lag between the emergence of a new technology
and the generation of sufficient demand. For
example, the U.S. economy has recorded impres-
sive productivity growth since the mid-1990s
thanks to innovations and massive investments
in ICT. But the ongoing financial crisis may dra-
matically alter the interpretation of the U.S. pro-
ductivity boom of the past decade. Some critics
suggest that the problem lies in the desire to
maintain growth above what is sustainable by
encouraging excessive investment in technology
and loosening regulations for risky innovations
in the financial sector. As far as macroeconomic
planning is concerned, this amounts to taking the
concept of “potential output” seriously.6
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSTRAINTS
The environment is a constraint on growth
in China. Increased environmental awareness at
both the central government and grassroots levels
will put greater pressure on regional authorities
to seek alternative patterns of growth. In Zheng,
Bigsten, and Hu (2009) we note 
The Chinese government has been working on
criteria and indexes of a green GDP, which
deducts the cost of environmental damage
and resources consumption from the tradi-
tional gross domestic product (People’s Daily,
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6 Krugman (1997) notes that standard economic analysis suggests
that the United States should not expect its economy to grow at
much more than 2 percent over the next few years. He notes further
that if the Federal Reserve tries to force faster growth by keeping
interest rates low, serious inflation could result. Of course, inflation
did not rise until recently, but the U.S. economy already started
overheating in the mid-1990s. Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh (2006)
project the best-case scenario for U.S. GDP growth to be 2.97 percent
per annum for 2005-15, with an uncertainty range of 1.9 to 3.5
percent. McNamee and Magnusson (1996) give a detailed discus-
sion on why a long-run growth rate of 2 percent could be a problem
for the U.S. economy as a whole.
Table 4
Productivity Slowdowns in the Soviet Union, United States, and EU
Countries Period GDP Capital Labor TFP
Soviet Union 1950-70 5.4 8.8 1.8 1.6
1970-85 2.7 7.0 1.1 –0.4
United States 1950-72 3.9 2.6 1.4 1.6
1972-96 3.3 3.1 1.7 0.6
1996-2004 3.6 2.6 0.7 1.5
EU (euro zone) 1960-73 5.1 4.8 3.2
1973-2003 2.2 0.5 2.8 1.0
SOURCE: Mostly period averages calculated from Ofer (1987) for the former Soviet Union, Gordon (2006) for the United States, and
Musso and Westermann (2005) for the euro zone.March 12, 2004). Preliminary results in the
recently issued Green GDP Accounting Study
Report (2004) suggest that economic losses due
to environmental pollution reached 512 billion
yuan, corresponding to 3.05% of GDP in 2004,
while the imputed treatment cost is 287 billion
yuan, corresponding to 1.80% of GDP (The
Central People’s Government of the People’s
Republic of China, 2006). Although the concept
of and measurement for green GDP are rather
controversial, the report may serve as a wakeup
call to the government’s strategy of growth at
all costs. 
From a productivity analysis perspective, the
concept of green GDP can be straightforwardly
extended to TFP, that is, green TFP. A slower
green TFP growth may imply a slower (green)
GDP growth. (p. 881)
We demonstrate that although the green GDP
level has increased as environmental factors have
been taken into account, “green TFP” growth
reveals a similar trend, as shown in the main text
of this article. 
Environmental Factors
The World Bank (1997) first proposed the
concept and calculation of “genuine domestic
savings,” that is, a country’s saving rate calcu-
lated after subtracting from total output the costs
of depletion of natural resources (especially the
nonreproducible resources) and environmental
pollution. 
A formal model of the genuine savings rate is
given by Hamilton and Clemens (1999): 
(17) 
Here, GNP–C is traditional gross savings,
which includes foreign savings, where GNP is
gross national product and C is consumption;
GNP–C–ʴK is traditional net savings, where ʴK is
the depreciation rate of produced assets; –n￿R–g￿
is resource depletion; S = –￿R–g￿ is resource
stocks, S, that grow by an amount g, are depleted
by extraction R, and are assumed to be costless
to produce; n is the net marginal resource rental
rate; –˃￿e–d￿ is pollution emission costs; X =
–￿e–d￿ is the growth of pollutants accumulated
into a pollution stock, X, where d is the quantity
G GNP C K n R g e d m = − − − − ( )− − ( )+ δ σ .
of natural dissipation of the pollution stock; ʴ is
the marginal social cost of pollution; and m is
investment in human capital (current education
expenditures), which does not depreciate (and
may be considered as a form of disembodied
knowledge). 
Natural resource depletion is measured by the
rent of exploiting and procuring natural resources.
The rent is the difference between the producing
price received by producers (measured by the
international price) and total production costs,
including the depreciation of fixed capital and
return of capital. 
Rational exploitation of natural resources is
necessary for economic growth; however, if
resource rents are too low, overexploitation may
result. If the resources rents are not reinvested
(e.g., in human resources) but instead used for
consumption, the exploitation is also “irrational.” 
Pollution loss mostly refers to harm caused
by CO2 pollution. It is calculated by the global
margin loss caused by one ton of CO2 emissions,
which Fankhauser (1995) suggests is US$20.
We expand the green GDP measure from the
World Bank to include not only natural capital
lost (negative factor) and education expenditure
(positive factor),7 but also net imports of primary
goods (positive factor) and sanitation expenditure
(positive factor). We calculate three different ver-
sions of GDP from 1978 to 2004: real GDP, World
Bank–adjusted green GDP, and our author-adjusted
green GDP (Table 5).
Green Capital
In the measurement of productivity, the differ-
ent measures of capital formation greatly influence
the measured capital stock constructed with the
perpetual inventory method. We can define the
green capital stock as following the method of
Hamilton, Ruta, and Tajibaeva (2005): 
(18)                 
where ʴit is the depreciation rate. (Time subscripts
are omitted.) Our depreciation rate increases
′ = ′ − ( )+ ′ − K K I it it it 1 1 δ ,
7 We use total education expenditures from NBSC (2006) instead of
the education expenditures from World Development Indicators
(2006). 
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Table 5
Different Measures of Green GDP (percent of real GDP)
World Bank– Total  Total  Net import  Author- 
Natural Education adjusted expense on expense on of primary adjusted
Year Real GDP capital lost expenditure green GDP education sanitation goods green GDP
1978 100 –23.01 1.85 78.84 2.10 3.10 –0.73 81.46
1979 100 –26.52  1.84  75.33  2.31  3.20  –0.77  78.22 
1980 100 –27.54  2.08  74.54  2.51  3.30  –0.71  77.56 
1981 100 –29.91  2.11  72.20  2.51  3.40  –0.77  75.23 
1982 100 –28.48  2.19  73.70  2.59  3.50  –0.86  76.75 
1983 100 –19.92  2.16  82.24  2.61  3.60  –1.27  85.02 
1984 100 –17.35  2.07  84.72  2.51  3.30  –2.18  86.28 
1985 100 –16.96  2.05  85.09  2.51  3.00  –2.80  85.75 
1986 100 –12.76  2.10  89.34  2.62  3.10  –1.90  91.06 
1987 100 –14.41  1.90  87.49  2.31  3.20  –1.97  89.13 
1988 100 –13.57  1.87  88.30  2.22  3.30  –1.08  90.87 
1989 100 –13.74  1.87  88.13  3.07  3.40  –0.74  91.99 
1990 100 –15.26  1.79  86.53  3.56  4.03  –1.56  90.77 
1991 100 –13.93  1.79  87.86  3.38  4.11  –1.31  92.25 
1992 100 –12.50  1.70  89.20  3.25  4.09  –0.78  94.06 
1993 100 –10.88  1.71  90.82  3.00  3.96  –0.40  95.68 
1994 100 –8.07  2.14  94.07  3.09  3.78  –0.58  98.22 
1995 100 –7.57  1.97  94.40  3.09  3.86  0.40  99.78 
1996 100 –7.27  2.01  94.74  3.18  4.21  0.41  100.53 
1997 100 –5.89  2.01  96.12  3.21  4.29  0.49  102.10 
1998 100 –3.98  1.97  97.99  3.49  4.47  0.24  104.22 
1999 100 –3.43  1.94  98.51  3.73  4.66  0.64  105.60 
2000 100 –4.87  1.95  97.07  3.88  4.62  1.78  105.41 
2001 100 –4.07  1.94  97.88  4.23  4.58  1.46  106.20 
2002 100 –4.03  1.95  97.92  4.55  4.81  1.43  106.76 
2003 100 –4.30  1.96  97.66  4.57  4.85  2.31  107.43 
2004 100 –4.58  1.97  97.39  4.53  4.75  3.97  108.67 
NOTE: World Bank–adjusted green GDP is the sum of columns 2, 3, and 4; the author-adjusted green GDP is the sum of columns 2, 3,
6, 7, and 8.
SOURCE: World Bank (2006) and NBSC (2006).along a linear trend from 4 percent in 1952 to 6
percent in 2004. I′ is the green fixed capital for-
mation. In Figure 3, the World Bank analysis
(Hamilton and Clemens, 1999) measures the
green investment in any geographic or political
area as 
(19)  
where I is the traditional investment, nit￿Rit – git￿ –
˃it￿eit – dit￿ is the natural capital lost, and mi is the
education expenditure. 
In this article, the author-adjusted green cap-
ital stock, K′′, measures green investment as
(20)            
where mit is total education expenditure (from
NBSC), nit is sanitation expenditure, and rit is net
import of primary goods. 
′′ = − − ( )
− − ( )+ +
I I n R g
e d m n
it it it it it
it it it it it σ + + rit,
′ = − − ( )− − ( )+ I I n R g e d m it it it it it it it it it σ ,
Green TFP
As shown in Table 6, compared with tradi-
tional GDP, the two adjusted green GDPs (the
World Bank and authors’ measures) have about
0.5 to 0.6 percent higher average TFP growth rates
in the 1978-2004 period, with lower TFP growth
in the 1992-2004 period (the author-adjusted GDP
is the lowest) than in the 1978-92 period. The TFP
growth rate of traditional GDP is more stable and
has the opposite trend. 
As shown in Figure 4, the annual TFP growth
rates of the adjusted green GDPs are higher than
traditional GDP in most years before 1992. They
reached 13 percent higher in 1983 and then began
to fall, roughly maintaining a gap of 1 to 2 percent-
age points with traditional GDP through 2004. In
2004, the green GDPs reached their lowest growth
rate, –4 percent. 
Our analysis finds that China’s growth has
varied between episodes of extensive and inten-
Zheng, Hu, Bigsten
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REVIEW JULY/AUGUST 2009 331
Table 6
GDP, Green GDP, and TFP Growth, 1978-2004 (percent)
Variable 1978-92 1992-2004 1978-2004
GDP 9.02 (100.0) 10.12 (100.0) 9.61 (100.0)
K 7.74 (34.3) 11.27 (44.5) 9.56 (39.8)
L 2.96 (9.8) 1.07 (3.2) 2.44 (7.6)
H 2.25 (7.5) 1.90 (5.6) 2.02 (6.3)
TFP1 4.36 (48.3) 4.72 (46.6) 4.45 (46.3)
GGDP1 9.87 (100.0) 11.06 (100.0) 10.51 (100.0)
K′ 5.95 (24.1) 15.88 (57.4) 10.42 (39.7)
L 2.96 (9.0) 1.07 (2.9) 2.44 (7.0)
H 2.25 (6.8) 1.90 (5.2) 2.02 (5.8)
TFP2′ 5.93 (60.1) 3.82 (34.5) 5.00 (47.6)
GGDP2 10.47 (100.0) 10.75 (100.0) 10.60 (100.0)
K′′ 5.80 (22.2) 15.97 (59.4) 10.37 (39.1)
L 2.96 (8.5) 1.07 (3.0) 2.44 (6.9)
H 2.25 (6.4) 1.90 (5.3) 2.02 (5.7)
TFP3′′ 6.59 (62.9) 3.47 (32.3) 5.11 (48.2)
NOTE: GDP here is real GDP in 1978 prices; GGDP1 is the World Bank–adjusted green GDP; GGDP2 is the author-adjusted green GDP.
K denotes capital services input, L labor input, H denotes inputs of education, sanitation expenditure, and imports of primary goods.
TFP denotes total factor productivity. The shares of capital, labor, and human resource are 0.4, 0.3, and 0.3, respectively. Numbers in
parentheses are the contribution ratio of each factor.sive growth. Economic growth in the 1980s was
intensive growth—higher TFP growth compen-
sated for the diminishing contribution of natural
resources, that is, of “natural capital.” During the
1990s, as a result of the comparative decline of
its natural resource consumption, China’s capital
stock began to increase rapidly and its growth
became more extensive, especially with respect
to capital.
CONCLUSION
In this study, we have updated our previously
published results on China’s growth pattern,
estimated China’s potential output growth using
official Chinese statistics, and compared China’s
medium-term growth perspectives with those for
the United States and EU. Our findings suggest
that China’s extensive growth pattern might be
sustainable in the intermediate term but not in
the long run. However, China may still sustain a
high growth rate of 8 to 9 percent if it manages
the transformation from extensive to intensive
growth. Several factors explain this possibility.
Compared with the United States and EU, China
is in a more favorable position with regard to (i)
production structure, (ii) the potential to absorb
new technologies, and (iii) investment opportu-
nities. Perhaps these three factors largely explain
Ed Prescott’s query (1998) as to why economic
“miracles” have been only a recent phenomenon. 
China’s reform policy since 1978 has dramati-
cally increased its GDP as well as its role in the
world economy. China was a marginal economy
in 1978, but by 2007 its share of world GDP
reached 5.99 percent at regular exchange rates
(or 10.83 percent at purchasing power parity rates)
(International Monetary Fund, 2008). This means
that China now has the same economic weight
as, for example, Germany. Because of China’s
rapid growth in recent years, its contribution to
world growth has been substantial. In 2007 it was
about 17 percent at regular exchange rates and as
much as 33 percent at purchasing power parity
rates. Even at regular exchange rates, China’s
contribution to global growth was considerably
larger than that of the United States or EU. The
global slowdown and financial contagion has
now reduced the growth rate in China. Still, we
believe China can continue to grow at a high rate
over an extended period of time, which suggests
that it will continue to be an important driver of
world growth.
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NOTE: This accounting does not include human capital. The share of capital and labor comes from Bai, Hsieh, and Qian’s (2006) 
estimation.China’s importance in the global markets for
goods and services also has increased consider-
ably. In 1978, China contributed 0.6 percent of
world exports, but by 2006 its share was over 7
percent (World Bank, 2008). This is an amazingly
fast expansion and entry into the global market.
The export boom China experienced during
the years before the world financial crisis of 2008
could not have continued at its rapid pace even in
the absence of a worldwide economic slowdown.
China’s rapid growth has been driven by U.S.
expansionary policy, China’s acceptance into the
World Trade Organization, the shift of assembly
plants from other countries to China, and the
undervaluation of China’s currency, the yuan.
The impact of these factors, however, cannot be
sustained. Export growth was further supported
by shifting the production structure toward the
international market. However, with exports
approaching half of GDP, there will be less scope
for further shifts. In the future it is likely that
export growth will more or less keep pace with
GDP growth. As long as China continues to grow
faster than the world average, it will increase its
global market share. China’s current strategy is to
shift its production toward more-sophisticated
goods and, even if the impact of such is as yet
limited, it is very likely that trend will continue.
This means that in the future we will likely see
more and more intra-industry trade between China
and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD). 
In the short term, the world is facing an
extreme international financial crisis. Debate about
China’s role in this crisis is intense. International
financial markets are clearly more integrated than
in earlier crises, although China has not opened its
capital account yet. With the rapid and extended
global economic growth, economic imbalances
have emerged, particularly between the United
States and China. The United States has been
undersaving and China has been oversaving. A
key issue is the character and speed of the rebal-
ancing process. In the United States, to build sav-
ings, consumption needs to increase at a slower
pace than incomes, which could hinder growth
for several years. How much China can counter-
act this by stimulating domestic demand remains
to be seen, but steps in this direction have been
taken. China has implemented a large fiscal
expansion. The focus of policy reforms in the
near future will probably be on domestic issues,
and macroeconomic policy interventions will
likely seek to stimulate local demand. The process
of adjustment will take a long time, however,
unless there is concerted policy action.
Another important issue is how international
negotiations about the future design of the finan-
cial system will evolve, particularly because of
the conflict between national sovereignty and
the needs of global capital markets. Still, future
discussions will have to involve China in a sub-
stantial way. 
China is also expanding its economic opera-
tions abroad by aggressively using its sovereign
wealth to acquire assets. It currently has extensive
resources, whereas other global investors are fac-
ing problems. So the current crisis is an opportu-
nity for China to invest abroad on a larger scale
than ever before. As much as 75 percent of China’s
investments are in developed countries to develop
marketing channels, access more advanced tech-
nology, and earn a good return on its capital.
There is a risk, though, that China may overpay
in its eagerness to acquire assets.
China enters the current crisis better prepared
than it was when hit by the 1997 East Asian finan-
cial crisis. Still, even if China today is one of the
most resilient economies in the world, it may not
be able to have a very large impact on the Western
economies. It buys many inputs from Asia, assem-
bles goods at home, and then sells final goods to
the OECD. This means that it will suffer during a
recession in wealthier countries. The export mar-
kets have also been hurt by the disruptions in the
trade credit market. Most intra-Asian trade is for
intermediates that are assembled in China and
then exported. Few Asian exports are for Chinese
demand. Thus, other Asian countries suffer when
China cannot export final goods to the OECD.
Countries that can supply the Chinese domestic
market may be able to benefit from Chinese
development, though.
Overall it is likely that China will continue
to grow and increase its market share and control
of wealth, which in turn will increase its economic
and political influence over the longer term. 
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APPENDIX: DATA DESCRIPTION
The main variables investigated in the study are aggregate output (GDP at a constant price), aggre-
gate labor (the number of people employed), and capital stock (accumulated fixed capital investment
at a constant price). For details of the treatment of data, see Zheng, Bigsten, and Hu (2009, appendix).
Here we outline the data used in addition to those in that study. 
Capital Stock
We have collected a series of capital stock, which is the accumulation of total social fixed asset
investment since 1978. We use the price indices of gross fixed capital formation from Historical Data
of China’s Gross Domestic Product Accounting, 1952-2004 (NBSC, 2007c) to deflate investment data
before 1990. For investment after 1990, we use the price indices of fixed asset investment from the
China Statistical Yearbook (NBSC, 2005a, 2006a, 2007a, and 2008) See Figures A1 through A3 for time
plots of the series and related measures. 
Labor
The labor force data used are the economically active population data from Comprehensive
Statistical Data and Materials on 55 Years of New China (NBSC, 2005b) and are extended to 2007 based
on the growth rate for each year from the China Statistical Yearbook (NBSC, 2005a, 2006, 2007a, and
2008). Because of the inconsistency of official data before 1990, we use an adjusted series of labor force
from Nan and Xue (2002) to update our pre-1990 data. The data on employment are from the China
Labour Statistical Yearbook (NBSC, 2007b). We generate a new series of the data before 1990 based on
the official unemployment (defined as the gap of economic active population and employment) and
the labor force data from Nan and Xue (2002). (See Figures A4 to A6.)
Human Capital 
To measure human capital, we use average years of schooling of Chinese laborers to adjust for
labor quality improvement. Data for 1978-2005 are from Holz (2005) and include two series, one with
and one without military service included. We use the former. “Labor” is defined as quality-adjusted
laborers, that is, the number of employees multiplied by the average years of schooling. (See Figures A7
to A9.)
Energy Consumption and Carbon Dioxide Emission
Energy consumption data and its structure are from Comprehensive Statistical Data and Materials
on 55 Years of New China (NBSC, 2005b), which provides consumption of fossil fuel (to estimate the
carbon dioxide [CO2] emissions) together with cement production data. CO2 emissions based on energy
consumption is calculated according to the following formula:CO2 Emissions = Consumption of Fossil Fuel8 × Carbon Emission Factor × Fraction of Carbon Oxidized
+ Production of Cement × Processing Emission Factor. 
The fraction of carbon oxidized refers to the ratio of carbon oxidized to the quantity of CO2 emitted,
which is a constant ratio 3.67 (44:12). The most important coefficient here is the carbon emission factor,
which refers to the equivalent carbon emissions in the consumption of fossil fuel. We use the factor from
the Energy Research Institute of China’s National Development and Reform Committee, which is 0.67
per ton of coal-equivalent fuel. Further, the production of cement emits more CO2 than the consumption
of fossil fuel because of the calcining of limestone, which on average creates 0.365 tons of CO2 per ton
of cement produced (China Cement, 2007).
8 A more-accurate calculation would exclude the carbon sink. We use the approximate amount because of the limited availablity of data.
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Figure A9
Dependency Ratio